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Litigating the FMLA in the Shadow of Title VII 
Sandra F. Sperino* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The history of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is a history 
of frameworks.1  In an almost predictable pattern, the Supreme Court 
has recognized a category of employment discrimination, and then, 
either in the same case, or sometime thereafter, created a multi-part 
test for evaluating it.2  
Congress enacted the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) in 
1993, almost 30 years after it enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.3  
This Essay argues that the FMLA is litigated within the shadow of 
Title VII, as courts routinely apply complex frameworks developed in 
the Title VII context to FMLA cases.   
This Essay explores how courts needlessly apply the three-part 
burden-shifting test from McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, devel-
oped in Title VII cases, to FMLA claims.  Using the lens of McDonnell 
Douglas, this Essay demonstrates how courts have drawn the FMLA 
into the same framework morass that currently exists for Title VII 
discrimination claims.  This phalanx of frameworks distracts courts 
away from the substantive core of the FMLA, and into endless argu-
ments about the substantive and procedural oddities of the frame-
works.  In turn, the replication of the discrimination frameworks in the 
FMLA increases their longevity and reach, making it even more diffi-
cult to diminish the frameworks’ grip over discrimination discourse. 
This Essay proceeds in three sections.  Section I discusses the 
McDonnell Douglas framework and its unique procedural and sub-
stantive features.  Section II describes how the courts imported 
McDonnell Douglas into the FMLA with little regard for the differ-
ences between Title VII and the FMLA.  Section III demonstrates 
                                                                                                                           
 
* Associate Professor, University of Cincinnati College of Law. 
 1 Sandra F. Sperino, Rethinking Discrimination Law, 110 MICH. L. REV. 69, 70 (2011). 
 2 Id. at 72. 
 3 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2006) et seq. 
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why it is problematic for courts to approach the FMLA’s substantive 
provisions through the current framework-driven approach. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Title VII and McDonnell Douglas 
Congress enacted Title VII of the Civil Rights Act in 1964, pro-
hibiting employment discrimination based on race, religion, color, na-
tional origin, and sex.  Title VII provides: 
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or oth-
erwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national 
origin; or 
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for 
employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive 
any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise ad-
versely affect his status as an employee, because of such individ-
ual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.4 
Title VII’s operative language is broad, and Congress did not specifi-
cally define many key terms.5  There is little evidence that district 
courts were struggling with how to evaluate individual disparate 
treatment cases.  Nonetheless, the appellate courts began to create 
complicated frameworks for determining whether an employer made 
a decision because of a protected trait.6 
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court cre-
ated a three-part, burden-shifting test for analyzing individual dispa-
rate treatment cases.7  Courts apply this test when a plaintiff relies on 
circumstantial, as opposed to direct evidence of discrimination.8  Un-
                                                                                                                           
 4 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2006).  
 5 Id. 
 6 See generally Sperino, supra note 1. 
 7 McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973).  Some circuits will allow a 
plaintiff to make a case of discrimination without resorting to McDonnell Douglas, if the plain-
tiff has “either direct or circumstantial evidence that supports an inference of intentional dis-
crimination.” See, e.g., Coffman v. Indianapolis Fire Dept., 578 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 8 See, e.g., Egonmwan v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff's Dept., 602 F.3d 845, 850-51 (7th Cir. 2010); 
Thompson v. Carrier Corp., 358 F. App’x 109, 111 (11th Cir. 2009) (“A plaintiff may establish a 
claim of discrimination under Title VII by direct or circumstantial evidence, and when only the 
latter is relied on, we use the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell Douglas 
Corp. v. Green[.]”); Taylor v. Seton Brackenridge Hosp., 349 F. App’x 874, 877 (5th Cir. 2009) 
(“Taylor has not provided direct evidence of discrimination, therefore, his claim based on cir-
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der McDonnell Douglas, a court first evaluates the prima facie case, 
which requires proof that: 
(i) [the plaintiff] belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied 
and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking 
applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; 
and (iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and 
the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of com-
plainant’s qualifications[.]9   
The burden then shifts to the employer to articulate some legiti-
mate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee’s rejection.10  If the 
defendant meets this requirement, the plaintiff can still prevail by 
demonstrating that the defendant’s reason for the rejection was sim-
ply pretext.11   
In McDonnell Douglas, the Court noted that the facts required to 
prove a prima facie case will necessarily vary, depending on the case.12  
After McDonnell Douglas, significant confusion existed about the 
three-part burden-shifting test, including questions regarding the de-
fendant’s burden at the second step in the inquiry, and the effect of a 
plaintiff’s showing of pretext.  Two subsequent cases clarified (and 
some would say altered) how the McDonnell Douglas test operates.  
In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, the Court ex-
plained that the defendant’s burden at the second step in the McDon-
nell-Douglas framework is a burden of production only.13  The Court 
held that the “ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the 
defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at 
all times with the plaintiff.”14  In Saint Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 
the Court considered whether the fact-finder’s rejection of the em-
ployer’s asserted reason for its action mandated a finding for the 
plaintiff.15  The Supreme Court held that while the fact-finder’s rejec-
tion of the employer’s proffered reason permits the fact-finder to infer 
discrimination, it does not compel such a finding.16 
The McDonnell Douglas test’s focus on the employer’s non-
discriminatory reason for its action implicitly suggested that discrimi-
                                                                                                                           
cumstantial evidence is analyzed under the burden-shifting framework established in McDonnell 
Douglas Corp. v. Green…”).   
 9 McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 802. 
 10 Id. 
 11 Id. at 804. 
 12 Id. at 802 n.13. 
 13 Texas Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981). 
 14 Id. at 253. 
 15 St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 504-07 (1993). 
 16 Id. at 510-11. 
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nation claims might only be cognizable if the plaintiff alleged that the 
employer acted only because of a discriminatory reason.  In the 1989 
case of Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court interpreted 
Title VII as allowing so called “mixed-motive” claims.17  Once again, it 
produced yet another test.  The Court held that a plaintiff must estab-
lish that a protected trait played a motivating factor in the employ-
ment decision.18  The employer has the ability to avoid liability by 
proving an affirmative defense—that it would have made the same 
decision, even if it had not allowed the protected trait to play a role.19  
While the Justices agreed on many of the central contours of mixed 
motive, they did not agree on whether a plaintiff must present direct 
evidence of discrimination to proceed through the framework.20 
In 1991, unhappy with the test the Court articulated for mixed 
motive, Congress amended Title VII.21  In doing so, Congress did not 
separately delineate a type of discrimination called “mixed motive” or 
enunciate a separate test.22  Rather, Congress indicated that a plaintiff 
could prevail on a discrimination claim under Title VII by establishing 
that a protected trait played a motivating factor in an employment 
decision.23 Congress also created an affirmative defense, which, if 
proven, would be a partial defense to damages.24  Courts began refer-
ring to the 1991 amendments as establishing a “mixed motive” claim 
with a two-part framework.25  Later, the Supreme Court decided the 
question that was left unresolved in Price Waterhouse, and held that 
the direct/circumstantial dichotomy would not be imported into the 
mixed-motive context under Title VII.26 
Although there is some variation among circuits, courts primarily 
analyze mixed-motive claims under Title VII through the statutory 
language of the 1991 amendments.  They analyze Title VII single-
motive discrimination claims based on circumstantial evidence 
through McDonnell Douglas. 
                                                                                                                           
 17 Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241-43, 52 (1989). 
 18 Id. at 244-46. For a description of how the same decision language was imported from 
constitutional claims, see Catherine T. Struve, Shifting Burdens: Discrimination Law Through the 
Lens of Jury Instructions, 51 B.C. L. REV. 279, 300-01 (2010). 
 19 Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 244-46.  
 20 Id. at 270-71 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (noting that to get the benefit of mixed-motive 
framework, plaintiff would be required to present direct evidence of discrimination).  
 21 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). 
 22 Id. 
 23 Id. 
 24 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(g)(2)(B)(i). 
 25 See, e.g., Porter v. Natsios, 414 F.3d 13, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2005). 
 26 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 92, 101-02 (2003). 
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B. A Substantive and Procedural Morass 
As discussed in more detail in the next section, the courts have 
widely used McDonnell Douglas in the FMLA context.  This section 
argues this use is normatively undesirable, and explores troubling fea-
tures of the burden-shifting test.  McDonnell Douglas is a substantive 
and procedural outlier in ways that make its use in the FMLA context 
problematic.  Its odd three-part burden-shifting structure is proce-
durally strange and confusing.  More importantly, it is not clear 
whether the test actually aids courts in making the discrimination in-
quiry. 
The courts describe McDonnell Douglas as an evidentiary 
framework27 that is supposed to help courts work through competing 
discrimination narratives.  Some courts have articulated that the prima 
facie case exists to force the defendant to articulate a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason for its actions.28  However, this rationale-forcing 
reason for McDonnell Douglas does not make sense under a modern 
discovery system, in which a plaintiff can discover the defendant’s pro-
fessed reasons for its decisions through numerous discovery devices.   
The test has never aligned well with the two procedural junctures 
at which it might be used: summary judgment and trial.  Take, for ex-
ample, a common summary judgment motion, in which the defendant 
requests summary judgment.  The defendant often articulates its le-
gitimate non-discriminatory reason for acting in support of its motion 
for summary judgment.  The prima facie case should play no role in 
such cases where the defendant has already articulated its reason for 
acting.  Nor does the tri-partite test align well with trial where a plain-
tiff is required to present his or her entire case in chief, followed by 
the defendant’s case.  Trial does not follow the model created by 
McDonnell Douglas, which anticipates a plaintiff’s prima facie case, 
followed by a defendant’s articulation (not proof) of a legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason, and then followed by the plaintiff’s response to 
that reason. 
The McDonnell Douglas test is so confusing in the jury trial con-
text that many circuits do not allow jury instructions to use the three-
part test.29  From a civil procedure standpoint, it is difficult to under-
                                                                                                                           
 27 Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 510 (2002) (“The prima facie case under 
McDonnell Douglas . . . is an evidentiary standard”). 
 28 See, e.g., Stratton v. Dep’t for the Aging for the City of N.Y., 132 F.3d 869, 879 (2d Cir. 
1997). 
 29 Whittington v. Nordam Grp. Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 998 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he instructions 
should not ‘lead jurors to abandon their own judgment and to seize upon poorly understood 
legalisms to decide the ultimate question of discrimination.’” (quoting Messina v. Kroblin Transp. 
Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1306, 1308 (10th Cir. 1990))); Kanida v. Gulf Coast Med. Pers. LP, 363 F.3d 568, 
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stand how courts are empowered to use one standard for evaluating 
summary judgment motions while instructing juries to use a different 
standard.30   
The test even confuses judges.  The McDonnell Douglas test was 
followed by decades of appellate decisions regarding how the test 
worked.31  And the test itself relies on distinctions that are elusive and 
that courts have difficulty describing.  In the Title VII context, courts 
are only supposed to use the test in so-called circumstantial evidence 
cases and not cases involving direct evidence, but it is difficult to draw 
a line between the two types of evidence.  Further, in most circuits, the 
McDonnell Douglas test is designed for cases involving a single-
motive, rather than cases involving mixed motives.32  However, in 
many circumstances it is difficult to determine whether the evidence 
supports single- or mixed-motive claims. 
Most importantly, it is not clear what McDonnell Douglas is de-
signed to accomplish substantively.  Some courts indicate that the test 
is a way for a plaintiff to establish intent when the plaintiff lacks clear 
evidence of intent.33  Others tie the test to the causation inquiry.34  This 
lack of clarity itself is problematic.  However, even if we ignore this 
confusion, it is still unclear whether McDonnell Douglas aids in any of 
its supposed goals, whether those goals are framed as concerning cau-
sation, intent, or a more generalized discrimination inquiry.  These 
problems are compounded when courts treat McDonnell Douglas as 
the primary or sometimes the only way for a plaintiff to establish a 
single-motive discrimination claim based on circumstantial evidence; 
rather than as one possible avenue for establishing discrimination.   
All of these problems with McDonnell Douglas have led scholars 
and some judges to call for the diminished or discontinued use of 
                                                                                                                           
576 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[D]istrict courts should not frame jury instructions based upon the intrica-
cies of the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting analysis”); Sanders v. New York City Human Res. 
Admin., 361 F.3d 749, 758 (2d Cir. 2004) (“Explaining [the burden shifting scheme of McDonnell 
Douglas] to the jury in the charge, we believe, is more likely to confuse rather than enlighten the 
members of the jury.”); Sanghvi v. Claremont, 328 F.3d 532, 539-41 (9th Cir. 2003) (concluding 
that it is error to charge the jury with the elements of McDonnell Douglas). 
 30 Compare Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, with  Fed. R. Civ. P. 50(a). 
 31 Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing, 530 U.S. 133, 142-43 (2000); O’Connor v. Consolidated 
Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S. 308, 310-12 (1996); St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 507 
(1993); Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). 
 32 Griffin v. Finkbeiner, 689 F.3d 584, 592 (6th Cir. 2012). 
 33 Barnette v. Fed. Express Corp., No. 12-10969, 2012 WL 4775029, at *11 (11th Cir. Oct. 9, 
2012). 
 34 Moffett v. Miss. Dept. of Mental Health, No. 12-60551, 2013 WL 150139, at *5 (5th Cir. 
Jan. 14, 2013). 
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McDonnell Douglas in the discrimination context.35  Circuit Judge Di-
ane Wood succinctly and compellingly argued against the continued 
dominance of the test.  In a concurring opinion in Coleman v. Dona-
hoe she wrote: 
I write separately to call attention to the snarls and knots that the 
current methodologies used in discrimination cases of all kinds 
have inflicted on courts and litigants alike.  The original McDon-
nell Douglas decision was designed to clarify and to simplify the 
plaintiff's task in presenting such a case.  Over the years, unfortu-
nately, both of those goals have gone by the wayside. . . .  Like a 
group of Mesopotamian scholars, we work hard to see if a “con-
vincing mosaic” can be assembled that would point to the equiva-
lent of the blatantly discriminatory statement.  If we move on to 
the indirect method, we engage in an allemande worthy of the 
16th century, carefully executing the first four steps of the dance 
for the prima facie case, shifting over to the partner for the “ar-
ticulation” interlude, and then concluding with the examination 
of evidence of pretext.  But, as my colleagues correctly point out, 
evidence relevant to one of the initial four steps is often (and is 
here) equally helpful for showing pretext. 
Perhaps McDonnell Douglas was necessary nearly 40 years ago, 
when Title VII litigation was still relatively new in the federal 
courts.  By now, however, as this case well illustrates, the various 
tests that we insist lawyers use have lost their utility.  Courts 
manage tort litigation every day without the ins and outs of these 
methods of proof, and I see no reason why employment discrimi-
nation litigation (including cases alleging retaliation) could not 
be handled in the same straightforward way.36 
III. THE FMLA AND MCDONNELL DOUGLAS 
Despite the concerns raised in the prior section, courts have ex-
panded the reach of McDonnell Douglas by applying it to the FMLA.  
This section discusses how this move is not supported by the text of 
the FMLA, and how the burden-shifting test does not fit well with the 
claims and evidence typically raised in FMLA cases. 
The FMLA has a two-tiered prohibited acts section.  The first 
subsection, titled “Interference with Rights,” makes it unlawful for an 
                                                                                                                           
 35 See, e.g., Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, 
Whither McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1891 (2004); Deborah C. Malamud, The Last 
Minuet: Disparate Treatment after Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2237 (1995). 
 36 Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 863 (7th Cir. 2012) (Wood, J., concurring). 
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employer “to interfere with, restrain, or deny the exercise of or the 
attempt to exercise, any right provided under this subchapter.”37  The 
second subsection, titled “Discrimination,” prohibits employers from 
firing or discriminating “in any other manner” against an individual 
who “opposes any practice made unlawful by this subchapter.”38 
Courts routinely apply the McDonnell Douglas test to retaliation 
cases brought under the FMLA, and some circuits apply the test to 
FMLA interference claims.39  In discrimination cases, which are some-
times referred to as retaliation cases, this test requires the plaintiff to 
prove a prima facie case, after which a rebuttable presumption of dis-
crimination is created.40  After this initial showing, the defendant must 
articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for its actions.41  If 
the defendant meets this minimal burden, the presumption of retalia-
tion drops from the case, and the plaintiff must establish that the em-
ployer’s asserted reason was a pretext for unlawful retaliation under 
the FMLA.42   
The reasoning that circuit courts employed to justify applying 
McDonnell Douglas to the FMLA is often cursory.  For example, the 
Second Circuit indicated that because FMLA retaliation cases involve 
intent, it is appropriate to apply McDonnell Douglas to them.43  The 
D.C. Circuit in one sentence simply noted the FMLA was like Title 
VII.44   
Even though courts are interpreting the FMLA in a textualist era, 
the courts have not explained why they should apply the same frame-
works to the FMLA and Title VII, despite the differences in both the 
text and purposes of the two statutory regimes.  As discussed earlier, 
Title VII originally contained a two-tiered operative provision.  This is 
the language that existed when the Supreme Court decided McDon-
                                                                                                                           
 37 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1) (2006). 
 38 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(2) (2006). 
 39 See Jaszczyszyn v. Advantage Health Physician Network, No. 11-1697, 2012 WL 5416616, 
at *13 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying McDonnell Douglas test to FMLA interference claims); Colburn 
v. Parker Hannifin/Nichols Portland Div., 429 F.3d 325, 335-36 (1st Cir. 2005) (applying McDon-
nell Douglas to retaliation claims and citing similar cases from other circuits).  But see Brown v. 
ScriptPro, LLC, 700 F.3d 1222, 1226-27 (10th Cir. 2012) (noting that McDonnell Douglas does not 
apply to interference claims). 
 40 Colburn, 429 F.3d at 336 n.10 (noting that to make out a prima facie case, “plaintiff must 
show (1) that he engaged in a protected action (here, requesting or taking FMLA leave); (2) that 
he suffered an adverse employment action (here, being fired); and (3) that there was some possi-
bility of a causal connection between the employee's protected activity and the employer's ad-
verse employment action, in that the two were not wholly unrelated”). 
 41 Id. at 336.  
 42 Id.  
 43 Potenza v. City of New York, 365 F.3d 165, 168 (2d Cir. 2004). 
 44 Gleklen v. Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm., Inc., 199 F.3d 1365, 1367 (D.C. Cir. 
2000). 
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nell Douglas in 1973.  In contrast, the FMLA has two primary opera-
tive provisions that do not mimic either the two-tiered structure or the 
language of Title VII’s core provisions.  Even if McDonnell Douglas is 
not a textualist interpretation of Title VII, it is difficult to imagine why 
courts would resort to rote borrowing of the test for statutes that look 
so vastly different from one another.   
This textual puzzle becomes more complex when considering the 
1991 amendments to Title VII.  When Congress amended Title VII in 
1991 to include the “motivating factor” language, this statutory change 
arguably challenged the continued use of McDonnell Douglas as the 
primary way to frame discrimination claims.45  Congress enacted the 
FMLA after the 1991 amendments to Title VII.  If the 1991 amend-
ments challenged McDonnell Douglas’ continued primary function in 
employment discrimination law, it is unlikely that Congress would 
nonetheless choose to enshrine McDonnell Douglas into the FMLA 
or intend for the courts to continue to use it as an evidentiary frame-
work. 
As discussed earlier, the three-part burden-shifting framework is 
confusing.  Outside of the core holding that pretext may be evidence 
of discrimination, it is difficult to determine what inquiry McDonnell 
Douglas aids.  Courts and commentators have struggled to determine 
whether McDonnell Douglas answers causal questions or whether it 
helps determine whether an actor possessed a certain requisite intent.  
Whatever questions McDonnell Douglas addresses, it is unclear why 
courts considering FMLA cases would need to answer those questions 
in the same manner, especially given the textual differences between 
the statutes.  
This is especially true given the differences in the types of claims 
raised by the FMLA and Title VII.  In many Title VII cases, the plain-
tiff claims that the employer discriminated against her based on a pro-
tected trait.  Title VII protection does not depend upon the perform-
ance of any act by the plaintiff.  Given that every employee falls 
within several protected classes under Title VII, the plaintiff’s status 
alone will not trigger liability or even a presumption of liability.  Ra-
ther, the plaintiff is required to put forth some extra evidence that an 
employment decision was taken because of a protected trait.  This evi-
dence is often what the courts deem to be circumstantial evidence, and 
McDonnell Douglas purports to help courts wade through what kinds 
of circumstantial evidence are sufficient to trigger liability and which 
are not.  As discussed earlier, although the courts are not absolutely 
clear in this regard, they require the plaintiff’s proof to establish that 
                                                                                                                           
 45 See Zimmer, supra note 35, at 1891. 
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the employer considered a protected trait in making an employment 
decision, which the courts often categorize as an intent requirement. 
The FMLA is different, though.  Once the plaintiff falls within the 
protected class of the FMLA and qualifies for its statutory entitle-
ments, the employer’s intent is not relevant to establishing liability 
under the interference provisions of the statute.  Liability hinges sim-
ply on whether the employer did not provide the plaintiff with leave 
or other entitlements under the FMLA.46  For this very reason, some 
courts reject the use of McDonnell Douglas in interference claims.47  
However, some courts cling to the burden-shifting test for interference 
claims.48 
FMLA “discrimination” claims are unlike Title VII discrimination 
claims.  Even using the terminology of discrimination under the 
FMLA is problematic, because the “discrimination” cause of action 
under the FMLA is more like a retaliation claim under Title VII.  In 
FMLA “discrimination” cases, the employer is not taking action 
against the plaintiff based on his or her characteristics or traits, but in 
response to actions taken by the plaintiff, either taking or seeking to 
take FMLA leave.   
Although some courts use the McDonnell Douglas framework in 
the Title VII retaliation context, others frame Title VII retaliation 
claims using a simpler, three-part test that requires the plaintiff to es-
tablish that she engaged in protected activity, that the employer took 
an adverse action, and that there is a causal connection between the 
two.49  If this simpler construct works for Title VII retaliation claims, it 
is unclear why courts should not use it for FMLA discrimination 
claims that the courts analogize to retaliation. 
IV. THE FRAMEWORK DILEMMA 
The courts’ use of the McDonnell Douglas test in the FMLA con-
text has serious consequences for both statutes.  This section explores 
these consequences and explains why it is important for courts to in-
terpret the FMLA on its own terms, rather than in the shadow of Title 
VII.   
One problem with applying McDonnell Douglas to the FMLA is 
that the FMLA gets drawn into the same interpretive problems that 
plague Title VII.  Over the past several decades, courts have explained 
                                                                                                                           
 46 Brown v. ScriptPro, LLC, 700 F.3d 1222, 1226-27 (10th Cir. 2012). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Jaszczyszyn v. Advantage Health Physician Network, No. 11-1697, 2012 WL 5416616, at 
*13-14 (6th Cir. Nov. 7, 2012) (discussing cases). 
 49 Coleman v. Donahoe, 667 F.3d 835, 859 (7th Cir. 2012). 
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that they use McDonnell Douglas in cases involving circumstantial 
evidence.50  After the Supreme Court’s rejection of the di-
rect/circumstantial evidence dichotomy in Title VII mixed motive cas-
es, it is difficult to understand why the dichotomy still exists at all.51  
Nonetheless, in FMLA cases, the courts still use this antiquated di-
chotomy to think about claims.52  
Further, in part because of McDonnell Douglas, the courts con-
ceived Title VII claims as being divided between what the courts call 
single-motive and mixed-motive claims.  In 1991, Congress amended 
Title VII to clarify whether plaintiffs could prevail if evidence existed 
that the employer considered both legitimate and discriminatory fac-
tors in making an employment decision.53  Congress did not amend the 
Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA),54 however, and the 
Supreme Court subsequently held that the ADEA does not permit so-
called mixed-motive claims.55  Even though the FMLA does not share 
the language of either Title VII or the ADEA, the courts have still 
been required to contend with the question of whether the FMLA 
allows plaintiffs to proceed with mixed-motive evidence.56 
Under McDonnell Douglas, courts allow a plaintiff to support his 
or her prima facie case by submitting evidence that the employer 
treated similarly-situated employees outside of the plaintiff’s pro-
tected trait differently.57  Scholars such as Professors Suzanne Gold-
berg and Charles Sullivan have correctly challenged the courts’ 
cramped notions of when fellow employees are similarly situated 
enough to serve as comparators in discrimination cases.58  Nonetheless, 
these same narrow notions are being employed in the FMLA con-
text.59  Requiring an FMLA plaintiff to establish a similarly situated 
comparator is especially odd in some FMLA cases where human re-
sources personnel are involved in the decision to grant or deny FMLA 
                                                                                                                           
 50 See, e.g., Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 584-85 (2007). 
 51 Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98-99 (2003) (discussing how the text of the Title 
VII does not distinguish between direct and circumstantial evidence). 
 52 Laws v. HealthSouth N. Ky. Rehab. Hosp. Ltd. P’ship, No. 11-6360, 2012 WL 6176797, at 
*5-6 (6th Cir. Dec. 11, 2012); Laws v. HealthSouth N. Ky. Rehab. Hosp. Ltd. P’ship, 828 F. Supp. 2d 
889, 906, 919 (E.D. Ky. 2011). 
 53 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006). 
 54 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (2006). 
 55 Gross v. FBL Fin. Servs., 557 U.S. 167, 176-78 (2009). 
 56 Lichtenstein v. Univ. of Pittsburgh Med. Ctr., 691 F.3d 294, 302 (3d Cir. 2012) (noting that 
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leave.  Human resources personnel are also often involved in making 
decisions either alone or with supervisors to take employment actions 
against employees subsequent to their FMLA leave or request for 
leave.  The requirement of strict comparators with the same supervisor 
as the plaintiff may make little sense in these cases. 
Another problematic McDonnell Douglas issue involves the 
courts’ response to the 1991 amendments to Title VII, as well as some 
courts’ recent express skepticism about McDonnell Douglas.  Since 
the 1991 amendments to Title VII, the federal appellate courts have 
created circuit splits about how courts should analyze individual dis-
parate treatment claims under Title VII.  The Fifth Circuit created a 
test that combines elements of McDonnell Douglas with the 1991 
amendments.60  The Seventh Circuit allows litigants to proceed under 
McDonnell Douglas; however, it also allows an alternate test by which 
the plaintiff can survive summary judgment by putting forth a con-
vincing mosaic of circumstantial evidence.61  It is unclear whether 
courts should interpret the FMLA with these new approaches, or 
whether courts should use the more traditional formulations of 
McDonnell Douglas.  More importantly, it is unclear whether litigation 
about what test to apply helps courts or litigants understand the 
FMLA better.   
Continued use of McDonnell Douglas in the FMLA context has 
repercussions for Title VII as well.  As courts further entrench 
McDonnell Douglas in contexts outside Title VII, it is difficult to limit 
its reach for Title VII claims. 
Perhaps more importantly, when courts use McDonnell Douglas 
to evaluate claims, it leads to a framework mentality.  If a set of facts 
meets the framework’s requirements, it is actionable.  If facts do not 
meet the framework’s requirements, they are not actionable.  This fo-
cus on frameworks has distracted courts from the core questions of 
Title VII.  Instead of discussing whether a jury might reasonably be-
lieve that an employer took a particular action because of a protected 
trait, the courts become mired in whether plaintiffs meet the specific 
requirements of a court-created test, whether or not this test fully or 
accurately captures plaintiffs’ lived realities or discrimination as it 
happens in the modern workplace.  In the Title VII context, the courts 
have spent decades mired in the intricacies of McDonnell Douglas 
and other discrimination frameworks, and there is little evidence that 
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these forays have increased the courts’ understanding of how dis-
crimination happens.   
As previously discussed, framework-driven issues are now con-
suming the courts’ attention in the FMLA context.  It is certain that 
the frameworks provide the courts with a process for proceeding 
through evidence, but it is unclear whether this process ultimately aids 
the courts in determining whether an employer has violated the 
FMLA.  A focus on frameworks distracts courts from the core con-
cerns of the FMLA.  Did the employer deny plaintiff an FMLA enti-
tlement?  Did the employer take an action against an employee be-
cause he or she took or sought to take FMLA leave?  Instead, courts 
and litigants focus on the frameworks, at the expense of a robust ex-
ploration of the FMLA’s protections. 
An example is helpful.  In a recent Sixth Circuit case, the plaintiff 
alleged that the employer cited as one of several reasons for termina-
tion that the plaintiff had absence issues.62  These absences were valid 
FMLA leave.  The plaintiff also alleged that the employer provided 
numerous, conflicting reasons for her termination.63  Using frame-
works, the district court granted summary judgment for the employer 
on this set of facts, even though it is clear that a reasonable jury could 
find the plaintiff’s FMLA leave played a role in the termination.   
This essay does not claim that courts should refrain from using 
reasoning originally developed under the discrimination statutes in 
the FMLA context.  Some of these cases represent careful thinking 
about problems central to both the discrimination statutes and the 
FMLA.  However, the courts should be cautious about adopting such 
reasoning without examining whether it makes sense in the specific 
context of the FMLA.  This caution is especially warranted when the 
courts are considering dragging the FMLA into the same framework 
morass that plagues the discrimination statutes. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The FMLA has always been litigated in the shadow of Title VII.  
Now that the FMLA is entering its twentieth year, it is important to 
consider whether continuing to litigate the FMLA using Title VII 
frameworks is necessary or desirable.  This question is especially im-
portant in relation to the McDonnell Douglas framework.  This year 
marks the fortieth anniversary of the McDonnell Douglas opinion.  
While this framework is still ubiquitous, recent published opinions are 
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questioning the framework’s continued primacy in discrimination law.  
Given that there are even less compelling reasons to use the frame-
work in the FMLA context, the judiciary and litigants should call for 
the test’s demise in FMLA cases as well. 
  
 
